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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Anno. 78-2-2(3), i, 1987.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. The default judgment awarded the Plaintiffs-Respondents
by the Trial Court violated the due process clause ofthe United
States

Federal

and

the Utah

State Constitutions

in that it

ordered demolition of property belonging to Beth Roberts Purdue
when she had not been named as defendant in Plaintiffs-Respondents' complaint.
2. The Trial Court erred in refusing to allow Beth Purdue to
be admitted as Defendant in a new trial on merits of the case.
3. The Trial Court erred in denying Defendant and Appellants
a new trial on the merits, since failure of Defendant to appear
at a second pretrial was excusable in that he mistakenly relied
on words and action of Plaintiffs' counsel at the first pretrial
leading Defendant to believe the second pretrial had been waived
by Plaintiffs.
4. The Trial Court erred in permitting Plaintiffs' counsel
to "correct" admitted errors in the complaint and in the default
judgment when the errors as to parties, ownership/ addresses,
legal description, location and building ordered demolished were
judicial, not "clerical" (i.e., mechanical) errors in transcrib-
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ing, but involved

factual and legal issues, correctable only

through a new trial on the merits of the case itself.
5. The Trial

Court

erred

in

sustaining

the Plaintiffs'

"corrected" default judgment which did not, in fact, "correct"
but compounded the "errors" of the original.
6. The Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to set
aside the default and to grant the parties a new trial on the
merits since (1) the Defendant's failure to appear was excusable;
(2) Defendant

and

Appellants

had

a meritorious

defense;

(3)

judicial errors were involved in the demolition order; and (4)
the

Trial

Court

lacked

jurisdiction

over

the

owner

of

the

property ordered demolished.
7. The demolition order should be vacated for reasons of
public benefit.

Defendant and Appellants' property is not dilap-

idated, dangerous or unsightly
complaint.

as alleged

in the Plaintiffs'

The property is, in fact, comparatively new, com-

fortable, modern, safe, attractive and eminently usable.
housing is desperately needed by the community.

Such

A responsible

humanitarian, nonprofit corporation has examined the property.
Its officials found the buildings repairable, and have presented
Defendant and Appellants with a bona fide offer to repair and
manage same.

This corporation will provide employment, super-

vision, on-the-job training, worthy incentives, and affordable
housing for low-income and homeless citizens of the community who
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have

been

neglected

and

discriminated

against

for

too

already.

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS

United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment:
No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Killian, Constitution of the United
States of America, p. 1212.
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall .
. deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. Killian, ibid., p. 1467.
Utah State Constitution, Article One, Section 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. Utah Code Anno.,
1953, p. 64.
"Due process of law" requires that, before one can
be bound by a judgment affecting his property rights,
some process must be served upon which . . . is calculated to give him notice. Naisbitt v. Herrick, 76 Utah
575 290 P950 (1930).
Due process of law requires that notice be given to
the person whose rights are to be affected. It hears
before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial. Higgs v. District Court of
Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P2d 645 (1935).
The order of an administrative body issued without
notice to affected individuals violates due process.
Morris v. Public Service Commission, 7 Utah 167, 321
P2d 644 (1958).

long

Utah State Constitution, Section 22
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation. Utah Code Anno.,
1953, p. 119.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant and Appellants seek voidance of default order of
demolition of property or properties in the vicinity of 500 North
and 300 West, in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Disposition in Lower Court
Plaintiffs-Respondents obtained an ambiguous Default Judgment for demolition of Appellants1 property or properties at 534
North 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah.

From verdict and default

judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs-Respondents, the Appellants
now appeal.

Relief Sought on Appeal
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment, revocation of the
demolition order, and judgment in Appellants' favor as a matter
of law, or that failing, a new trial,

Standard of Review
Defendant and Appellants state that the issues presented on
appeal are as follows:
1. Default

judgment was based

on Plaintiffs-Respondents'

errors of fact, fraud in jurisdictional matters, manipulation of
- 4 -

pretrial

proceedings,

misrepresentation

of

location

property ordered demolished and the ownership thereof.

of

the

The court

erred in its refusal to hear an essential party, and in refusing
to rehear the case on its merits despite good cause appearing.
Appellants ask that judgment be set aside in the interest of
justice to them and for the benefit of low-income and homeless
persons in the community whom appellants will be unable to serve
if this building is demolished.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs-Respondents obtained a default judgment against
John Purdue from the Third District Court dated on or about January 31, 1991, ordering the demolition of a building situated on
the property of Appellant Beth Roberts Purdue at 534 North 300
West, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Defendant John Purdue and Appellant

Beth Purdue request the Utah State Supreme Court to vacate this
order.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. The property ordered demolished, 534 North 300 West, Salt
Lake City, Utah, is not now and was not, at the time the complaint was filed, owned by the party named as Defendant (John
Purdue).

It has since 1955 belonged to Beth Roberts (Purdue).

See Addendum 2, 3, and 4.

- 5 -

2. The demolition

order was obtained

by default due to

manipulation by the Plaintiffs-Respondents' attorney of pretrial
procedures which led Defendant John Purdue to reasonably believe
that further appearances prior to the trial would be fruitless,
unnecessary, and had been waived by the Plaintiffs-Respondents.
3. No legal description or correct address of the subject
property was given in the Plaintiffs-Respondents' complaint or in
the demolition order, just the street address of 534 North 300
West, Salt Lake City, Utah, a property owned by Beth Purdue, who
was not summoned or named as a party to the suit, though her name
was surreptitiously added to the judgment and order by the Plaintiffs-Respondents' attorney after he had been awarded the default
judgment and demolition order.
4. The District Court erred in granting a demolition order
(by default) of a property belonging to Beth Purdue, who had not
been brought under the jurisdiction of the court.
5. Appellants John Purdue and Beth Purdue filed a motion in
the District Court as soon as they learned of the default judgment, asking to have it set aside and requesting a trial of the
case on its merits.

The court denied this motion but ordered the

Plaintiffs-Respondents' attorney to correct what the judge called
"clerical errors."

Appellants contend that these errors were not

"clerical" but judgmental and thus correctable only by a new
hearing of the case on its merits.
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The "corrections" made by the

attorney on the judge's order served only to compound the errors
and magnify the injustice of the ruling against the appellants.
6. The Plaintiffs-Respondents' errors pertaining to address,
ownership of property, and the absence of a legal description of
the property to be demolished go to the heart and essence of the
case.

These are not mere "clerical errors" but involve judg-

mental determinations.

This case was never tried on its merits

and the order should be vacated.
7. To demolish a viable, modern, comfortable, safe, sturdy
low-rent housing facility at this time when shortage of affordable housing has driven hundreds into homelessness and has raised
rents for all tenants in the area would be wasteful, inhumane and
against public policy.
8.
"Family

A

responsible

humanitarian

House, Inc.," is seeking

nonprofit

organization,

to rehabilitate appellants'

buildings to provide low-rent housing and to teach building and
maintenance skills to the unemployed.
is included in Appendix 4.

A copy of their proposal

This should satisfy any legitimate

concerns of the Plaintiffs-Respondents concerning the condition
of the property and its effect on the neighborhood.

ARGUMENT
(1)

The Court abused discretion by failing to vacate judgment ordering demolition of property belonging to Beth
Roberts (Purdue), over whom the court had no jurisdiction.
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As soon as Defendant John Purdue learned of the default
judgment awarded to the Plaintiffs against both John and
Beth Purdue, the Purdues promptly filed a Notice of Objection and a motion for a hearing asking for the default to be
vacated and to have the demolition order revoked, or for a
trial on the merits and inclusion of Beth Purdue as defendant since she had not been summoned or included in Plaintiffs' complaint but she claimed an interest in the property
ordered demolished.
At the hearing on the motion, the judge refused to
revoke the default judgment or to hear Beth Purdue or to
listen to John Purdue's meritorious defense.

The judge

ordered plaintiff's attorney to remove Beth Purdue's name
from the judgment and demolition order which he thereupon
sustained.
Appellants

contend

this

refusal

to

set

aside

the

default and revoke the demolition order was an abuse of discretion in accordance with Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60
(b)(1).

In a Utah case in 1969 this court held:

It is ordinarily abuse of discretion to refuse to
vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable
justification or excuse for failure to appear and
timely application is made to set it aside. Central
Finance Company v. Kynaston, 452 P2d, 316 22, Utah 2d
284. See also Mayhew v. Standard Gelsonite 1962, 376
P2d 951-14, Utah 2d 5 2.
Default judgments are not favored by the courts
which are liberal in relieving parties of defaults
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caused by inadvertence or excusable neglect and where
doubt exists (ibid.).
Utah 1962. Default judgments are not favored by the
courts nor are they in the interest of justice and fair
play. Heathman v. Falican Ind Clendenin 377 P2d 189
14 Utah 2d.
Utah 1974. Generally, whenever interests of justice
and fair play will be served thereby trial court should
exercise its discretion liberally in favor and giving
parties an opportunity for hearing on the merits of the
case. Barber v. Calderf 522 P2d 700.
Utah (n.d.).
Courts should exercise caution in
regard to default judgments and should be somewhat
indulgent in setting suth judgments aside. McKeon v.
Mountain View Estates, Inc., 411 P2d, 129 17 Utah 2d
323.
Utah 1956.
The default judgment should have been
vacated in its entirety in accordance with Rule 60 of
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60b(d). Kelly v.
Scott, 298 P2d, 821 5 Utah 2d 159.
Utah 1963. Courts will generally grant relief from
a default judgment in doubtful cases in order that
defaulting parties may have a hearing. Board of Education of Granite School District v. Cox, 384 P2d 806 14
Utah 2d 385.
Utah (n.d.). On motion to vacate a default judgment
discretion must be exercised in the furtherance of
justice and the court will incline toward granting
relief in a doubtful case so that party may have a
hearing. Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 260 P2A, 741 13 Utah
416.
Utah 1955.
In case of uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to allow trial on merits.
Locke v. Peterson, 285 P2d 11113 Utah 2d 415.
Utah 1956. Under usual circumstances it is inequitable and unjust to condemn a party unheard; doubts
should be resolved in favor of setting aside default
judgment to permit parties to have their day in court.
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b).
Chrysler v.
Chrysler 303 P2d 995 5 Utah 2d 415.
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Other states have ruled similarly:
Nevada 1961.
In general, the party who has good
defense should, when prompt application to vacate
default judgment is made, be allowed to set it up notwithstanding any negligence of himself or counsel.
Blakeney v. Freemont Hotel, Inc., 360 P2d 1039 77 Nev.
191.
Nevada 1966.
Defaulting actions of one defendant
cannot be imputed to another who behaves properly.
Doyle v. Jorgensen, 414 P2d 707 82 Nev 196.
Kansas 1975.
General principles cannot justify
denying the parties their day in court except upon a
serious showing of willful default. Vickers v. Kansas
City, 531 P2d 113216 Kan 84.
Arizona 1967.
Default judgments are not favored.
Ramada Inns v. Lane Bird Advertising, Inc., 426 P2d
395, 102 Ariz. 127.
Arizona 1967. Judgment entered by default without
notice against party timely answering
is void.
McClintock v. Serv us Bakers, 423 P2d 722 5 Ariz. App.
California 1957. The policy of the law is to allow
a controversy to be tried and determined on its merits.
Beckley v. Reclamation Board of State of California,
312 P2d 109848c 2d 710.
Hawaii 1962. Defendant who had filed an answer and
thus appeared in action had right to notice of application by plaintiff for default judgment even if defendant who did not appear at preconference was in
default.
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55(b)(2).
Stafford v. Dickison, 374 P2d 665 Haw 52.
Oklahoma 1975. Default judgments are never viewed
with favor.
Burroughs v. Bob Martin Corp., 536 P2d
339.
Washington (n.d.).
Grounds for vacating a default
judgment are excusable neglect or fraud practiced by
prevailing party.
Bishop v. Illman, 126 P2d 582 14
Wash 2d 13.
Washington 1960. It is the policy of the law that
controversies be settled on the merits rather than by
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default.
718.

Dlouhy v. Dlouhy, 349 P2d 1074 55 Wash 2d

Wyoming 1964. Judgments by default are not favored.
Westring v. Cheyenne National Bank, 393 P2d 824, 63 Wyo
375; Lake v. Lake, 182 P2d 824, 119 63 Wyo.
Wyoming 1964. Purpose of rule (60b) governing vacation of default judgments is to provide courts with
means of relieving party from oppression of final judgment or order on proper showing where such judgments
are unfairly or mistakenly entered (ibid.).
(2)

The trial court erred in ordering the plaintiff to
amend the default judgment to correct "clerical errors"
which were in fact judicial errors.
These corrections as to address, location, ownership, and

legal description of the property, proper parties to the suit,
and the property ordered demolished go to the heart and essence
of the case, and involve judgmental errors made by the Plaintiffs-Respondents in their complaint and in the default judgment
awarded by the court.
These are not "clerical errors" made by a typist but judgmental errors correctable only by a new trial of the case on its
merits.

The Plaintiffs-Respondents' so-called "corrections" only

further compounded the confusion and injustice of the default
judgment.
A "clerical error" is one made by a clerk in transcribing or otherwise, and, of course, must be apparent
on the face of the record, and capable of being
corrected by reference to the record only.
Froth v.
Birmingham Ry., Light and Power Co., 39 So 716, 717 144
Ala. 383.
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A judicial error may not be corrected by trial court
under the guise of rectifying a "clerical error."
Carpenter v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of California, 96 P2d 796-799, 14 Cal. 2dM4.
A clerical error, as its designation imports, is an
error of a clerk or a subordinate officer in transcribing or entering an official proceeding ordered by
another.
Marsh v. Nichols Shepard and Co., 9 S Ct.
168, 171, 128 US 605 2d L Ed 538.
Errors into which the court itself falls are "judicial errors." An error of this character occurs when
the judgment rendered is erroneous in some particular,
requiring it to be changed. It is not a mere "clerical
error" but one affecting the substance and justice of
the judgment. Connecticut Mortgage and Title Guarantee
Co. v. De Francesco, 151a 491, 492, 112 Conn 673.
"Clerical mistake" includes only errors or mistakes
arising from accidental slip or omission, and not
errors or mistakes in the substance of what is decided
by judgment or order.
Town of Hialeah Gardens v.
Hendry, Fla. 376 So 2d 1162 1164.
"Clerical errors" which Trial Court may correct more
than 30 days after judgment do not include judicial
errors, rule permitting correction of clerical errors
may not be used to enter judgment different from judgment actually made, even if judgment made was not judgment intended. Hassler v. State Mo. App. 789 SW 2d 1
32, 1 33.
Error in judgment or order may be corrected as
"clerical mistake" only where error does not involve
any judgment or discretion of the court.
Matter of
American Precision Vibrator Co. C.9-5 (Tex) 863 F2d
428-430.
A "clerical error" for which relief will be granted
from a judgment is an error made by clerk in transcribing or otherwise. West Virginia Oil and Gas Co.
v. Breece Lumber Co., CA La 213 F 2d 702, 705.
Where plaintiff seeking to foreclose mortgage stipulated that only those properties listed in exhibit were
being foreclosed, mistake in description as to one
parcel was not a "clerical mistake" which would permit
trial court to amend judgment. Foster v. Knutson, 516
P2d 786, 787, 10 Wash App 175.
- 12 -

"Clerical mistakes" correctable under rule refer to
type of error identified with mistakes in transmission,
alteration or omission of a mechanical nature. . . .
If pronouncement reflects a deliberate choice on the
part of the court, the act is judicial, and errors of
this nature are to be cured by appeal.
Spomer v.
Spomer, Wyo 580 P2d 1146-1149.
(3)

Demolition of the subject property would be needless,
wasteful and against public interest and humanitarian
concerns.
There is a critical shortage of affordable housing here-

about,

resulting

persons.

in

homelessness

for

hundreds

of

low-income

If not destroyed, this building can, should and will be

immediately rehabilitated to replenish the community's dwindling
low-rent housing supply.
Appellants are eager and able to restore and reoccupy their
properties.

They submit as an exhibit to this brief (Addendum 8)

an offer from Family House, Inc., to lease a building at 535-537
Arctic Court, Salt Lake City, Utah, which will be extended to an
offer to lease the property in question, 534 North 300 West,
together with the following properties (all in Salt Lake City,
Utah):

542 North 300 West, 515 Arctic Court, 242-244 West 500

North, and 554-556 North 300 West.

All of these properties have

been referred to over the years in sequence by Appellants as
Bob's Motel Annex, in the order of their acquisition.

Such

restorations would provide at least 60 desperately needed lowrent housing units.
These leases are contingent upon vacation of this confusing
and ambiguous demolition order.

If appeal results in removing
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this jeopardy, the would-be lessors, Family House, Inc., will
effectuate a program where they employ licensed contractors to
take out permits and to direct, train, and supervise the talents
and labor of unemployed and homeless persons.

These persons then

participate in the restoration and maintenance of the units they
will occupy at low rent thereafter.
This program provides employment, on-the-job training, and
incentives as well as desperately needed housing.

The organiza-

tion is presently rehabilitating a 14-unit property known as 338
North 300 West in Salt Lake City, Utah, two blocks from Appellants' property.

It is a humanitarian, nonprofit and proven pro-

gram which deserves the support and encouragement of all volunteer and paid social workers, community improvement agencies and
advocates of the poor such as Plaintiffs-Respondents1 attorney,
Bruce Plenk, and the Capitol Hill Neighborhood Council he represents.
The rehabilitation of lives and properties and neighborhoods
which this program provides is a far more worthy objective than
the creation of more weed-filled vacant lots, which would be the
tragic, irreversible and only possible result if this demolition
order is not vacated by this court.

CONCLUSION
The judicial errors involved in the default judgment granted
to the Plaintiffs-Respondents and the confusion regarding which
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property is involved, and the ownership thereof, together with
the failure of the plaintiff to bring an essential party under
the jurisdiction of the court should dictate that this default
judgment be vacated.
Precedent, legal theory, statutes, plus beneficient public
policy and simple justice all support Defendant and Appellants'
plea.
this

After filing their complaint, Plaintiffs-Respondents let
ill-conceived

lawsuit

lay

dormant

for

18 months

threatened with dismissal for failure to prosecute.

until

If demoli-

tion were to result from this judgment, no one would benefit, not
even the plaintiffs.

The appellants would suffer grievous eco-

nomic and financial loss.

The community would lose valuable

housing and tax base, and the homeless would be deprived of a way
out of their hopeless misery and misfortune.
Wherefore, the appellants pray the court to set aside this
default

judgment

and

prevent

the

demolition

of

Appellant's

property.
Signature of parties:

Defendant-Appellant

Beth Roberts (Purdue), Appellant
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./

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the

/

day of January,

1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by
mailing postpaid to Bruce Plenk, Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents, 124 South 400 East, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT

84111.

LIST OF ADDENDA
Affidavit of John Purdue regarding excusable nonappearance
at second pretrial "mediation" conference, January 3, 1991.
Warranty deed showing ownership of property in the name of
Beth Roberts since 1955.
nd 4. Printout from Salt Lake County tax rolls (1991) showing
properties at 534 North 300 West (Salt Lake City), still
vested in Beth Roberts (Purdue).
Notice of entry of judgment ordering demolition of property
belonging to Beth Purdue (534 North 300 West, Salt Lake
City, Utah), also showing plaintiff's surreptitious inclusion of Beth Purdue's name on the judgment though she was
not included or summoned as defendant when complaint was
filed.
Plaintiff's notice of readiness for trial showing only John
Purdue as party to the proceeding.
Proposal for demolition of Beth Purdue's property at 534
North 300 West, Salt Lake City, by Northern Nevada Construction Company, prepared by John Henry on order of Bruce
Plenk.
Residential lease offer from Family House, Inc., to lease,
rehabilitate and occupy property at 535 North Arctic Court,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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ADDENDUM 1
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN PURDUE
Regarding defendant's nonappearance at pretrial mediation hearing Janury 3f 1991 , defendant John Purdue gives the
following explanation.
Early in 1989, Plaintiffs-Respondents filed this suit.
I, John Purdue, the only defendant summoned or named in the
complaint, responded timely by filing pro se an answer to
the complaint.
Thereafter, the Plaintiffs-Respondents let the case lie
dormant for 18 months.

Then in September 1990, after the

court threatened to dismiss the case for plaintiffs' failure
to prosecute, attorney Plenk filed a Notice of Readiness for
Trial and scheduled a pretrial conference for November 14,
1990.

On that date I appeared at the scheduled time in

Judge Murphy's court.
Plaintiffs' attorney, Bruce Plenk, did not arrive at
the appointed time.

The judge did not appear at any time.

After waiting almost an hour in the empty courtroom, I consulted with the court clerk as to whether or not I should
leave.

The clerk telephoned Mr. Plenk at his office.

I

waited another 30 minutes before Mr. Plenk arrived.
Upon his arrival, Mr. Plenk went directly to the clerk.
The two of them had a private conversation from which I was

excluded. Then Mr. Plenk left the courtroom.

I followed him

into the corridor to learn what was to happen next and when.
I had expected this pretrial conference would deal with
scheduling and that my wishes would be consulted.
It was

important

that

I be consulted,

for

it was

advisable that we be in Arizona and Nevada between the
November pretrial and the trial date scheduled for February.
I was not consulted in regard to any further pretrials.
Nothing about scheduling was mentioned by Mr. Plenk but
we became involved in a heated discussion concerning why Mr.
Plenk was recklessly seeking

to demolish sturdy, viable,

modern low-rent housing when Mr. Plenk professes to be an
advocate of the poor and homeless.
During the discussion it became obvious, and Mr. Plenk
stated to me that further negotiation or mediation efforts
would be futile.

This corresponded with what Mr. Plenk had

stated on September 20, 1990, in his Certificate of Readiness for Trial, paragraph (4):
That reasonable discussions to effect settlement have been pursued by counsel and their
clients but no settlement has been effected..
Consequently,
assumed

no further

trial already

I logically,

reasonably

and

naturally

conferences would occur prior to the

scheduled

for February

1991.

I was thus

unaware of and was thus dissuaded from being present at the
second pretrial hearing (January 3, 1991) held while I was

out of state at which the plaintiff obtained by default the
order to demolish the property belonging to my wife, Beth
Roberts (Purdue), located at 534 North 300 West, Salt Lake
City, Utah.

<%~t,v£L

John W. Purdue
Defendant-Appellant
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ffail tax notice to
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SAL? LAKE COOOTT^ .UTAJ
Ref.:

Address......

WARRANTY DEED
DOROTHY. G. GARCIA,
of

Salt Lake City

»County of

grantor
Salt Lake

» State of Utah, hereby

CONVEY and WARRANT to
BETH R03EP.TS, also known as BETH ALENE ROBERTS
grantee
of

Salt Lake City

for the sum of

County

Salt Lake

, State of Utah

TDf AND NO/lOO
($10.00) - and other good and valuable consideration

the following described tract of land in

DOLLARS,

County,

Salt Lake

State of Utah, to-wit:
BEGINNING at' the Southwest corner cf Lot 5* Block 132,
Plat "A" i Salt I*eke City Surrey, and running thence
North 44.44 feetj thence East 165 feetj thence South
44*44 feet; thence Vest 165 feet to the place of beginning.
Subject to any and a l l general taxes and special
assessments levied or assessed, due or to become due
after December 31st, 1954*

WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this
Signed in the presence of

30th day of

June

A.D. 19 55

..^X^M^.^...x(^jQ^^J^r

. . ; ^ & ^ ^

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

I

. Salt LakJ

•a.

On the

jfe)

day of Jum

appeared before me

A. D., 19

55 personally

DOROTHI o r GARCIA

>>\*n

My Commission expires...#^y^.#./ r y..Z^..£..My residence IsJTl.. Jalt.Xakei.Clty^:.I
TRIB DtSD PftlNTSD ESPBCtALLT POt PHOTO RECORDtKO, USB SLACK INK AND TTPS,
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I"08-36-205-007-0000
:ERTS, BETH

3 6>

DIST 01
PRINT

U

TOTAL ACRES
REAL ESTATE
BUILDINGS
MOTOR VEHIC
TOTAL VALUE

0.17
29400
28000
0
57400

UPDATE
LEGAL
TAX CLASS NE
7 E SOUTHTEMPLE ST
EDIT 1
BATCH NO
0
UT
841021641
BATCH SEQ
0
534 N 300 U
EDIT 1
BOOK 0000 PAGE 0000 DATE 00/00/00
t:
TYPE UNKN PLAT
P R O P E R T Y
D E S C R I P T ION
COM AT SU COR LOT 5 BLK 132 PLAT A SLC SUR N 44.44 FT E 10
RDS S 44.44 FT U 10 RDS TO BEG

DI 08-36-205-008-0000
BERTS, BETH A.
77 E SOUTHTEMPLE ST
:, UT
:: 534 N 300 W
3:

DIST 01

TOTAL ACRES
0.27
UPDATE
REAL ESTATE
20300
LEGAL
BUILDINGS
10000
TAX CLASS NE
MOTOR VEHIC
0
EDIT 1
BATCH NO
0
TOTAL VALUE
30300
841021641
BATCH SEQ
0
EDIT 1
BOOK 0000 PAGE OOOO DATE 00/00/00
TYPE UNKN PLAT
PRINT

U

P R O P E R T Y
D E S C R I P T I O N
COM AT NW COR LOT 4 BLK 132 PLAT A SLC SUR S 70 FT E 10 RDS
N 70 FT W 10 RDS TO BEG

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By: BRUCE PLENK #2613
124 South 400 East, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8891
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
CAPITOL HILL NEIGHBORHOOD
COUNCIL, INC., a non-profit
Corporation, and KEITH
AND DEBBIE WIDDISON,
Plaintiffs,

a
:
s
\!

NOTICE OF ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT

J
1(

VS.

Civil No. 890902814

I

JOHN AND BETH PURDUE,

i

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendants.
Pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
all parties are hereby notified that on the 31st day of January,
1991, a Default Judgment against defendants was entered by the
Court ordering the building located at 534 North 300 West, Salt
Lake City, Utah be demolished on or before May 15, 1991.

If

defendants fail to comply with this order, plaintiffs are awarded
judgment in the amount of $4,400 plus demolition permit fees and
any other costs to be placed in trust with plaintiffs' attorney to
be used solely for• paying
payin the costs of demolition.
DATED this

S

day of

f^i/J

, 1991.

3
UTAH LEGAL/SERVICES, INC.

Attorneys yEtfr P l a i n t i f f s
:

BRUCE PLENK

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BY: BRUCE PLENK, #2613
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8891
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAPITOL HILL NEIGHBORHOOD
COUNCIL, INC., a non-profit
Corporation, and KEITH
AND DEBBIE WIDDISON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN PURDUE,
Defendant.

*
*
*
*

CERTIFICATE OF
READINESS FOR TRIAL

*
*
*
*
*
*

Civil No. 890902814
Judge Michael R. Murphy

TO THE DISTRICT COURT:
Utah Legal Services, Inc., by Bruce Plenk, attorney for
Plaintiffs, by his signature below here certifies that in his
judgment this case is ready for trial and in support of such
certification counsel represents to the Court as follows:
1.

That all required pleadings have been filed and the case

is at issue as to all parties.
2.

That counsel has completed all discovery; and that all

discovery of record has been completed.
3.

That there are no motions that have been filed which

remain pending and upon which no disposition has been made.

4.

That reasonable discussions to effect settlement have

been pursued by counsel and their clients but no settlement has
been effected.
5.

Non-jury trial is demanded.

Counsel further certifies that the following were mailed
correct copies of this certificate:
John Purdue
1177 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

DATED this

Hp^day of

SgyCtrivJIr^

, 1990,

UTAH LEGAL
Attorneys f

RVICES, INC.
Plaintiffs

LP
B*:

[a:capitol.cer NAP]
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BRUCE PLENK

Expert Demolition & Excavation
350 W. Hartwell • Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 • (801) 485-6655

Proposal
R E E T T ^

'

*

nr, STATE
XND ZIP
ZIP CODE
coot
ATE AND

VJ

I JOB NAME

rs

Bt-^c- p&tto

JOB LOCATION

,

f?*f N) ><?OCJ

S^C~

B hereby proposetofumtsh material* and labor necessary for the completion of

p3*rtflM

f

YUSHQVL, 4?c/tld(A<

- fi(( fe

CMSAI*

3

H^JC

• Sewers will be capped at edge of building.
•

Buried debris that is not structurally related to building(s) mentioned herein will be removed at additional cost

•

Extra work will be performed when a price has been agreed upon by both the owner & ourselves.

W l ^ R O P O S E hereby to furnish material and labor — complete in accordance with above specifications, for the sum of:

de within 30 days of completion of work. /

/

Ail material is guaranteed to be as specified. All work to be completed in a substantial workmanlike
manner according to specifications submitted, per standard practices Any alteration or deviation
from above specifications involving extra costs will be executed only upon written orders, and will
become an extra charge over and above the estimate All agreements contingent upon strikes,
accidents or delays beyond our control. Owners to carry fire, tornado and other necessary
insurance Our workers are fully covered by Workmen's Compensation Insurance

A C C E P T A N C E O F P R O P O S A L The above prices, specifications and conditions are
satisfactory and are hereby accepted. You are authorized to do the work as specified. Payment will
be made as outlined above

P.O. Box 17193
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Residential — Commercial
Total Property Management

RESIDENTIAL LEASE
Apartment - Condominium - House
BY THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into on
between
and y**ytPY) i / </ M>tMut J&JC^
Lessor leases to Lessee the m»mkp<: situate/I at £> 3*J

£ C> »^^

, 19 9 /
, herein referred to as Lessor,
t , herein referred to as Lessee,
AJ, /h2 7"7 C
larly desenbed as

, together with all appurtenances, for a term of
& AJ C~ years, to commence on
, 19 °TZ^. and to end on 3/ j-ft+S
, 19 9 3 >

/Ab

1. Rent. Lessee agrees to pay, without demand, to Lessor as rent for the demised premises the sum of
PMA> O^iW

(S /M

/ te&
check
neck or
or cash.

) per monthQn advance on the"

Dollars

T

/ ^-" day of each calendar month beginning

, 1 9 ^ 2 ^ Payments are to De maae Dy money order, certified
Personal checks are not acceptable. ^n°r#.T\k)<^ ^s £>O<*AJ A$>

2. Security Deposit. On execution of this lease, Lessee deposits with Lessor
^
Dollars
(S /04 ^
)» receipt of which is acknowledged by .Lessor, as security for the faithful
performance by Lessee of the terms hereof, to be returned to Lessee, without interest, on the full and faithful
performance by him of the provisions hereof.
3. Quiet Enjoyment. Lessor covenants that on paying the rent and performing the covenants
herein contained. Lessee shall peacefully and quietly have, hold, and enjoy the demised premises for the agreed
term.
4. Use of Premises. The demised premises shall be used and occupied by Lessee exclusively as
a private single family residence, and neither the premises nor any pan thereof shall be used at anytimeduring
the term of this lease by Lessee for the purpose of carrying on any business, profession, or trade of any kind,
or for any purpose other than as a private single family residence. Lessee shall comply with all the sanitary
laws, ordinances, rules, and orders of appiopnate governmental authorities affecting the cleanliness,
occupancy, and preservation of the demised premises, and the sidewalks connected thereto, during the term of
this lease.
5. NumberxfcfjQccupants. Lessee agrees that the demised premises shall be occupied by no
more than A// //persons,
consisting of
adults wd/CJ/fi
children under the age of
years, without the written consent of Lessor.
6. Condition of Premises. Lessee stipulates that he has examined the demised premises,
including the grounds and all buildings and improvements, and that they are. a c c e p t e d "as i s " u n l e s s
e x c e p t i o n s are noted on page 3 o f t h i s c o n t r a c t .
7. Assignment and Subletting. Without the prior written consent of Lessor, Lessee shall
not assign this lease, or sublet or grant any concession or licence to use the premises or any part thereof. A
consent by Lessor to one assignment, subletting, concession, or license shall not be deemed to be a consent
to any subsequent assignment, subletdng, concession, or license. An assignment, subletting, concession, or
license without the prior written consent of Lessor, or an assignment or subletting by operation of law, shall
be void and shall, at Lessor's option, terminate this lease.
8. Alterations and Improvements. Lessee shall make no alterations to the buildings on the
demised premises or construct any building or make other improvements on the demised premises without the
prior written consent of Lessor. All alterations, changes, and improvements built, construct^ Cr ^zctd on
the demised premises b/ Lc^cc, with die exception of fixtures removable without damage to the premises and
movable personal property, shall, unless otherwise provided by written agreement between Lessor and Lessee,
be the property of Lessor and remain on the demised premises at the expiration or sooner termination of this
lease.
9. Damage to Premises. If the demised premises, or any part thereof, shall be partially
damaged by fire or other casualty not due to Lessee's negligence or willful act or that of his employee, family,
agent, or visitor, the premises shall be promptly repaired by Lessor and there shall be an abatement of rent
corresponding with the ume during which, and the extent to which, the leased premises may have been
untenantable; but, if the leased premises should be damaged other than by Lessee's negligence or willful act
or that of his employee, family, agent, or visitor to the extent that Lessor shall decide not to rebuild or repair,
the term of this lease shall end and the rent shall be prorated up to the time of the damage.
^

^

1

^

f»/of\L

A-f-fiw*- 4 -

thing of a dangerous, mtiammaoie, or CXPIUMYG cumacua mat imguw uiuvo^uaui; *».,**.-«-%, —>, >—.0^. „.
on the leased premises or that might be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance
company.
11. Utilities. Lessee shall be responsible for arranging for and paying for all utility services
sna
required on the premises, except that
Kl<Xj%^
^
be provided by Lessor.
12. Maintenance and Repair, Lessee will, at his sole expense, keep and maintain the leased
premises and appurtenances in good and sanitary condition and repair during the term of this lease and any
renewal thereof. In particular, Lessee shall keep the fixtures in the house or on or about the leased premises
in good order and repair, keep the furnace clean; keep the electric bells in order; keep the walks irtt from dirt
and debris; and, at his sole expense, shall make all required repairs to the plumbing, range, heating, apparatus,
and electric and gas fixtures whenever damage thereto shall have resulted from Lessee's misuse, waste, or
neglect or that of his employee, family, agent, or visitor. Major maintenance and repair of the leased
premises, not due to Lessee's misuse, waste, or neglect or that of his employee, family, agent, or visitor,
shall be the responsibility of Lessor or his assigns. - Lsw&t**^
TZ> p #&«> ce
*<-<- wtf&i*->
Lessee agrees that no signs shall be placed or painting done on or about the leased premises by
Lessee or at his direction without the prior written consent of Lessor.
13. Animals. Lessee shall keep no domestic or other animals on or about the leased premises
without the written consent of Lessor.
14. Right of Inspection. Lessor and his agents shall have the right at all reasonable times
during the term of this lease and any renewal thereof to enter the demised premises for the purpose of
inspecting the premises and all building and improvements thereon.
15. Display of Signs. During the last 30
d a y s 0 f ^'IS | e a s C f Lessor or his agent shall
have the privilege of displaying the usual "For Sale" or "For Rent" or "Vacancy" signs on the demised
premises and of showing the property to prospective purchasers or tenants.
16. Subordination of Lease. This lease and Lessee's leasehold interest hereunder are and shall
be subject, subordinate, and inferior to any liens or encumbrances now or hereafter placed on the demised
premises by Lessor, all advances made under any such liens or encumbrances, the interest payable on any such
liens or encumbrances, and any and all renewals or extensions of such liens or encumbrances.
17. Holdover by Lessee. Should Lessee remain in possession of the demised premises with the
consent of Lessor after the natural expiration of this lease, a new month-to-month tenancy shall be created
between Lessor and Lessee which shall be subject to all the terms and conditions hereof but shall be
terminated on
days' written notice served by either Lessor or Lessee on the other party.
18. Surrender of Premises. At the expiration of the lease term, Lessee shall quit and surrender
the premises hereby demised in as good state and condition as they were at the commencement of this lease,
reasonable use and wear thereof and damages by the elements excepted.
19. Default. If any default is made in the payment of rent, or any part thereof, at the times
hereinbefore specified, or if any default is made in the performance of or compliance with any other term or
condition hereof, the lease, at the option of Lessor, shall terminate and be forfeited, and Lessor may re-enter
the premises and remove all persons therefrom. Lessee shall be given written notice of any default or breach,
and termination and forfeiture of the lease shall not result if, within 5
days of receipt of such notice,
Lessee has corrected the default or breach or has taken action reasonably likely to effect such correction within
a reasonable time.
20. Abandonment. If at any time during the term of this lease Lessee abandons the demised
premises or any part thereof, Lessor may, at his option, enter the demised premises by any means without
being liable for any prosecution therefor, and without becoming liable to Lessee for damages or for any
payment of any kind whatever, and may, at his discretion, as agent for Lessee, relet the demised premises, or
any part thereof, for the whole or any part of the then unexpired term, and may receive and collect all rent
payable by virtue of such reletting, and, at Lessor's option, hold Lessee liable for any difference between the
rent that would have been pyable under this lease during the balance of the unexpired term, if this lease had
continued in force, and the net rent for such period realized by Lessor by means of such reletting. If Lessor's
right of re-entry is exercised following abandonment of the premises by Lessee, then Lessor may consider any
personal property belonging to Lessee and left on the premises to also have been abandoned, in which case
Lessor may dispose of all such personal property in any manner Lessor shall deem proper and is hereby
relieved of all liability for doing so.
21. Binding Effect. The covenants and conditions herein contained shall apply to and bind the
heirs, legal representatives, and assigns of the parties hereto, and all covenants are to be construed as
conditions of this lea^e.
22. Other Terms:

Other terms noted on page 3 of this contract. ^ ^

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this lease at
, the day and yearfirstabove written.

Lessor

Lessee

.„ ,. jfe

„ y - W /f

/U-

